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Notes
Administrative Law-FPC v. Texaco: Congress, not the Court,
Should Deregulate Natural Gas Producers
The Federal Power Commission is authorized by the Natural Gas
Act' to insure that rates charged for natural gas sold or transported in
interstate commerce are "just and reasonable."2  In reviewing FPC
rate regulations to determine if the test of "just and reasonable" has
been met,3 courts have pursued a policy of flexibility based upon the
assumption that a Commission order is a "product of expert judgment
which carries a presumption of validity."'4 Pursuant to this policy, the
courts have sustained Commission ordered rates based upon a variety
of formulas. 5 When the Commission, however, prices gas on the basis
of contract prices or upon the unregulated intrastate market price,' con-
flicting judicial attitudes have emerged. 7 The Court in FPC v. Tex-
aco, Inc.8 finally defined the role that market price could play in rate
determinations for producers. The Court rejected the standard of
market price as the sole determinant of "just and reasonable" but stated
that it could be a relevant factor in future rate considerations. Al-
though the Court restricted the Commission's use of market price, it
did further the earlier policy of flexibility by approving for -the first time
a different method of rate regulation for small producersY
1. Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (1970).
2. Id. § 717c.
3. Commission orders are subject to initial review by a court of appeals of the
United States, subject to final review by the Supreme Court. Id. § 717r(b).
4. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602 (1944).
5. See, e.g., id. (individual company cost-of-service method of regulation);
Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968) (area price approach).
6. It is estimated that there are some 30,000 domestic oil and gas producers.
AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH, NATURAL GAS DEREG-
ULATION LEGISLATION 15 (1973). The FPC has jurisdiction over producers involved in
the sale or transportation of gas interstate. There are approximately 4,000 interstate
producers. See note 17 infra. The sizeable intrastate market, consisting of the re-
mainder of producers, is not regulated by the FPC. These intrastate producers currently
account for almost 40% of the volume of gas produced. C. Hawkins, Structure of the
Natural Gas Producing Industry, in REGULA7ION OF THE NATURAL GAS PRODUCING IN-
DusRY 137, 156 (1972).
7. The Court in Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968), concluded
that the Commission could find in the future that market price would protect consumer
interests; whereas the Court in FPC v. Sunray DX Oil Co., 391 U.S. 9, 25-26 (1968),
stated that the Commission's use of market prices as the final measure of reasonable-
ness would contradict the assumption of Congress that the market for natural gas is un-
competitive and requires regulation.
8. 417 U.S. 380 (1974).
9. "A 'small produce? was defined as an independent producer, not affiliated with
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FPC ORDER No. 428 AND THE COURT'S DECISION
FPC v. Texaco resulted from FPC Order No. 42810 that exempted
small producers of gas from direct rate regulation and allowed them
to sell their gas at any price obtainable on the open market. Since
large producer and pipeline companies purchase most of the gas pro-
duced by small producers, the Commission decided to review small
producer prices for gas only at the large producer and pipeline level.
Thus, small producer prices would be regulated, but only indirectly.
Large producers and pipelines would have to justify the prices paid to
small producers before these costs could be passed along to the con-
sumer. If the prices paid by these companies to small producers were
deemed excessive by the Commission, then large producer and pipe-
line companies would alone be responsible for absorbing the excesses.
Small producer charges would never be subject to refunds to large pro-
ducer or pipeline companies under the order. The Commission
hoped that freeing small producers from direct rate regulation would
result in greater exploration and increased supplies of natural gas. 1
Large producer and pipeline companies objected to Order 428
arguing that allowing small producers to charge market prices, in effect
deregulated the small producers in contravention of the Natural Gas
Act.'2 Large producer and pipeline companies sought judicial review
of Order 428 in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. That
court, agreeing with the large producers, set aside the FPC order'8 and
the Commission appealed to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals decision and
upheld the method of indirect regulation provided in the order by stat-
ing that the Natural Gas Act calls for no specific method of regula-
a natural gas pipeline company whose total jurisdictional sales on a nationwide basis,
together with sales of affiliated producers, did not exceed 10,000,000 Mcf at 14.65 psia
during any calendar year. New small producer sales included any sale made pursuant
to a contract dated after March 18, 1971." Id. at 383 n.1.
10. 18 C.F.R. § 157.40 (1973).
11. Small producers were singled out for speciaF treatment since they traditionally
account for over 80% of all new exploration for gas. Texaco, Inc. v. FPC, 474 F.2d
416, 418 (D.C. Cir. 1972), rev'd, 417 U.S. 380 (1974). The major goal of Order 428
was to increase gas supplies. Thd natural gas shortage has been judicially recognized.
See Louisiana Power & Light Co.,. 406 U.S. 621 (1972); Placid Oil Co. v. FPC, 483
F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1973), aff'd sub nom. Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 417 U.S. 283 (1974);
Southern La. Area Rate Cases v. FPC, 428 F.2d 407 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
950 (1970).
12. See Brief for Respondent Phillips Petroleum Co. at 32-39, Brief for Respondent
Texaco, Inc. at 9-12, FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 417 U.S. 380 (1974).
13. Texaco, Inc. v. FPC, 474 F.2d 416 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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tion.14 It remanded Order 428 to the Commission, however, with the
instructions that, although market prices could be considered, they
could not be the sole factor in determining whether the prices charged
by small producers were "just and reasonable." The Court reasoned
that allowing the Commission to rely solely on market prices would be
tantamount to deregulation of small producers in contravention of Con-
gress's mandate in the Natural Gas Act that gas prices be regulated.1 5
The Court felt bound by the congressional finding that the natural gas
industry is not competitive and that prices charged by gas producers
must be justified on a basis other than the unregulated market stand-
ard.
COURT'S POLICY OF FLEXIBILITY
The Commission and the courts have struggled with the regulation
of interstate natural gas producers since the Supreme Court decided
in Phillips v. Wisconsin"6 that the FPC had jurisdiction over producers.
Phillips added over 4000 producers to the regulatory burdens of the
Commission.17 Since this decision, the Court has followed a policy of
14. FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 417 U.S. 380 (1974). Before the Supreme Court, the
FPC joined by small producers argued that Order 428 was simply a new technique of
regulating a segment of the industry and that the Natural Gas Act does not specify any
method of regulation. They maintained that indirect regulation of small producers
would spur exploration by these companies by eliminating cumbersome administrative
filing requirements and direct review. Regarding the court of appeals decision that a
market price standard for reviewing small producer rates resulted in deregulation in vio-
lation of the Natural Gas Act, the Commission and small producers advanced different
arguments justifying the standard as expressed in Order 428. In its brief, the Commis-
sion maintained that the court of appeals misread Order 428. The Commission con-
tended that the standard for review of small-producer charges in the order did not rest
exclusively on market price. It argued that the order called for the consideration of
"other relevant factors" in addition to market price. Small producers directly confronted
the issue of a market price standard by stating that nothing in the Natural Gas Act re-
quires regulation of all producer prices. They argued that, upon a determination by the
Commission that market prices could effectively protect consumer interests (insure "just
and reasonable" rates), such a standard is permissible under the Act. See Brief for Peti-
tioner at 18, Brief for the Small Producer Group as Amicus Curiae at 7 n.3, FPC v.
Texaco, Inc., 417 U.S. 380 (1974).
15. The Court found that the standard upon which small producer charges would
be reviewed was the market standard despite Commission attempts to explain that it
would consider other relevant factors upon review. The Court stated that "we cannot
'accept appellate counsel's post hoc rationalizations for agency action'. . . ." 417 U.S.
at 397, quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962).
16. 347 U.S. 672 (1954). This decision was based on language in the Natural Gas
Act that the Court determined required submission of natural gas producers to regulation
under the Act. The decision was not based on any congressional findings regarding the
existence of a monopoly in the gas producing industry as there was in the 1930's when
gas pipeline companies were initially subjected to FPC regulation under the Act. See
Note, Legislative History of the Natural Gas Act, 44 GEo. L.J. 695, 721-23 (1956).
17. There are several different figures reported for the number of producers subject
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flexibility towards Commission attempts to find a workable method of
regulation.' 8 The Commission's first efforts to assure "just and reason-
able" prices to consumers were based on an individual company, cost-
of-service analysis.' 9 This method required Commission review of
each individual gas producer for a determination of the proper rates
it could charge based on its costs of operation. The Court in FPC v.
Hope Natural Gas Co.2" had earlier sustained this method of regulation
for pibelines by stating very simply that, so long as the result of the
Commission's regulation is protection of consumer and investor interests,
the program would be sustained.2'
The cost-of-service analysis proved to be very time consuming, how-
ever, and the Commission soon formulated a new method of regula-
tion.22 It divided the country into five geographic regions and allowed
producers within each region to charge prices that were based on the
average costs of production within their particular area.23  This scheme
greatly reduced the administrative burdens of the Commission although
it did not effectively deal with small producers. The Court in Permian
Basin Area Rate Cases24 sustained this new method of regulation con-
tuining its earlier announced policy of flexibility in dealing with FPC
regulation of producers. Nonetheless, it admonished the Commission
to the Federal Power Commission's jurisdiction in 1954 when Phillips was decided. In
1955, Dr. John W. Boatwright, economist for Standard Oil Company of Indiana, testified
that there were some 8,100 producers of natural gas in the United States. Hearings on
S. 712, S. 1248, S. 1853, S. 1880, S. 1926, & S. 2001 Before the Senate Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 143-44 (1955). The figure of"over 4,000 producers" is reported in AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INsTrrUTE FOR PUBLIC POL-
ICY RESEARCH, supra note 6, at 11.
18. E.g., cases cited note 5 supra.
19. The cost-of-service regulatory approach is traditionally used in the regulation
of utilities. For a discussion of why this approach is not suitable to the gas producing
industry see Breyer & MacAvoy, The Natural Gas Shortage and the Regulation of Natu-
ral Gas Producers, 86 HRv. L. REv. 941, 952-58 (1973); Connole, General Considera-
tions: a Nation's Natural-Gas Pains, 44 GEo. L.J. 555, 563-65 (1956). See Swift, Fed-
eral Power Commission Regulation of Interstate Sales by Independent Natural Gas
Producers, 10 S. TEx. L.J. 183 (1968) (discussion of the Phillips case and initial FPC
attempts at regulation based on the individual company cost-of-service method).
20. 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
21. "Under the statutory formula of 'just and reasonable' it is the result reached
not the method employed which is controlling." Id. at 602.
22. By 1960 only ten cases of 2900 had been decided by the Commission. The
Phillips case alone, for example, required eighty-two days of hearings. See Breyer &
MacAvoy, supra note 19, at 952-54.
23. The five areas were: (1) The Permian Basin (Texas and part of New Mex-
ico); (2) Southern Louisiana (including the offshore area in the Gulf of Mexico); (3)
Hugoton-Anadarko (part of Oklahoma and Kansas); (4) Texas Gulf Coast; and (5)
Other Southwest (Mississippi, Arkansas, and part of Alabama, Texas and Oklahoma).
Id. at 958 n.65.
24. 390 U.S. 747 (1968).
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to deal with the problems of small producers in future rate proceed-
ings.
The judicial policy of flexibility regarding Commission experi-
ments in regulation has, however, not been consistently applied when
the Commission has attempted to allow market price to determine "just
and reasonable" rates. Several lower courts rejected market price in
initial pricing proceedings under section 7 of the Act because there was
no evidence introduced to support a finding that the unregulated price
in the field, if adopted ,by a producer, would meet the test of "just and
reasonable."2 5  There was, however, no holding in these cases that, if
proof could be offered that the unregulated price would protect con-
sumer interests, market price would not be sustained. Permian inti-
mated that market price could be the sole determinative standard for
area rates in the future so long as consumer and investor interests were
protected.20  There is, however, one case, FPC v. Sunray DX Oil
Co.,27 that maintains in dicta that, even if evidence were introduced
to support a finding that market price could protect consumer and in-
vestor interests, the Commission and the court could not allow use of
such a scheme.28 The Court in Sunray stated that regulation based upon
unregulated market prices would conflict with the congressional as-
sumption expressed in the Natural Gas Act that the industry requires
regulation because the market for natural gas is not competitive. Ac-
cording to the language in this case, the Commission could never justify
the unregulated market price as a "just and reasonable" price and still
comply with the Natural Gas Act.
FPC v. Texaco, Inc.29 followed the policy of flexibility expressed
in earlier court reactions to FPC experiments in regulating producers.
By sanctioning a scheme of indirect regulation, the Court indicated that
it would allow the Commission not only to treat small producers dif-
ferently in an attempt to encourage more gas production in a time of
25. See, e.g., United Gas Improvement Co. v. FPC, 290 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1961);
Forest Oil Corp. v. FPC, 263 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1959). The Natural Gas Act requires
that a company desiring to engage in the transportation or sale of natural gas, subject
to the Commission's jurisdiction, obtain from the Commission a certificate of public con-
venience and necessity. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c) (1970). Since the Court's decision in At-
lantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378 (1959), initial rates must be deter-
mined to be in the public interest prior to proceedings under section four of the Act,
where the Commission finally sets the rate that meets the requirement of "just and rea-
sonable." 15 U.S.C. § 717c (1970).
26. 390 U.S. at 795.
27. 391 U.S. 9 (1968).
28. Id. at 25.
29. 417 U.S. 380 (1974).
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shortage, but also to place upon large producers and pipelines the bur-
den of justifying in later proceedings the costs of small producer
charges. The Court, relying on Hope, pointed out that the Natural Gas
Act does not require any particular method of regulation. 30 Indeed, the
Court's inquiry is not focused upon the method utilized but upon
whether that method ensures "just and reasonable" rates. The Court
also pursued a policy of flexibility regarding the application of market
price to the standard of "just and reasonable." It stated that market
price should and would be an appropriate consideration in determin-
ing the standard of "just and reasonable" prices.31 But the Court re-
fused to let market price be the sole determinant of this standard. In-
stead, it held that, so long as Congress intends to regulate the interstate
natural gas industry, unregulated prices like those found in the intra-
state market can never be the final measure of "just and reasonable"
rates. The Court emphasized that, if the market has become competi-
tive (as recent economic studies suggest), it is the responsibility of
Congress to take steps towards deregulating the industry.12  Thus, the
Court in Texaco pursued the policy of flexibility towards Commission
regulatory experiments to the limits of congressional intent as
expressed in the Natural Gas Act. This decision properly places upon
Congress the obligation to respond to an alarming shortage of natural
gas. Congress should now seriously consider deregulating the natural
gas producing industry.
AN ARGUMENT FOR CONGRESSIONAL DEREGULATION
In determining whether deregulation is the appropriate response
by Congress to the shortage of natural gas, the results of regulation un-
der the Act and the present market structure of the gas producing in-
dustry must be examined. Initially, Congress sought to regulate the
natural gas industry because it believed that major pipeline companies
had monopolized the market and were exploiting consumers by charg-
ing excessive prices. "  The same rationale is applied to producers as
30. Id. at 391-92. See also Note, Public Utility Rate Regulation-Tine for Re-
evaluation, 51 N.C.L. REv. 1140 (1973).
31. Id. at 394-97. FPC v. Texaco has recently been cited for this holding in Moss
v. FPC, 502 F.2d 461, 466 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
32. 417 U.S. at 400. The Court recognizes in a footnote that economists have
found that the natural gas market has become competitive and that further regulation
would prove counterproductive; however, the Court stipulates that it is bound by con-
gressional intent. Id. at 400 n.9.
33. These congressional findings were based on a report by the FTC on the natu-
ral gas industry. F.T.C., FINAL REPORT, S. Doc. No. 92, 71st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 84-
A (1936).
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a result of the Court's finding in Phillips that the Natural 'Gas Act in-
cludes the regulation of natural gas producers.3 4  Regulation of the in-
dustry was expected to reduce prices paid by consumers by eliminating
windfall profits to producers. Congress's primary goal of lower con-
sumer prices for natural gas has resulted from regulation. Yet, through
cost-benefit analysis, economists conclude that the long term effect of
regulation has not benefited the consumer because lower prices have
had a negative impact on the supply of gas.3 5
A study conducted by Professors Breyer and MacAvoy shows that
producer regulation saved consumers about $660 million annually as-
suming that every cent of price reduction at the wellhead was passed
through to the ultimate consumer.3 6 They maintain, however, that con-
sumer losses far outweigh the benefits of lower prices. They contend,
as have other economists, that FPC price regulation has been the major
inhibitor of the supply of gas. Regulation has produced greater de-
mand at lower prices, but lower prices have not produced the incentives
necessary for exploration and development of gas reserves that are now
more difficult and expensive to find. Breyer and MacAvoy conclude
that the present federal regulation of natural gas imposes high costs on
the interstate consumer by forcing him to purchase more expensive al-
ternative fuels, reducing the dependability of his gas supply and subsi-
dizing the industrial user of natural gas in intrastate markets.
7
With this evidence that regulation has not benefited the consumer,
the more important question for Congress is whether increased supplies
34. See note 16 supra.
35. See, e.g., K. Brown, Introduction to REGULATION OF THE NATURAL GAS PRO-
DUCING INDUSTRY 1 (1972); C. Hawkins, supra note 6, at 137; M. Russell, Producer Reg-
ulation for the 1970s, in REGULATION OF THE NATURAL GAS PRODUCING INDUSTRY 219
(1972); Breyer & MacAvoy, supra note 19, at 976-79.
36. Breyer & MacAvoy, supra note 19, at 980.
37. Breyer and MacAvoy report that due to lower regulated prices, the supply of
natural gas was reduced. As a result of decreased supplies some consumers (usually
those consumers in new or growing population centers) had to do without gas and find
other more costly sources of energy, such as oil or electricity. In addition, Breyer and
MacAvoy maintain that FPC ceiling prices resulted in the development of fewer gas re-
serves. This meant that consumers had to give up a substantial amount of their guaran-
tee of future service. For example, gas reserves promise an availability of gas service
for the consumer who has invested in gas appliances. Breyer and MacAvoy present data
which estimates that at current ceiling prices additional gas reserves are being developed
at less than half of anticipated consumer needs. Furthermore, they explain that most
of the gas reserves now being discovered and developed are being sold in the intrastate
market at higher prices. The major purchasers and consumers of intrastate gas are in-
dustrial users rather than residential consumers. Thus, the industrial user is more as-
sured of gas supplies at the expense of the residential consumer whose supply normally
comes through interstate sales. Id. at 977-84.
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of gas would be forthcoming at acceptable prices absent regulation.
Several recent economic studies show the market for natural gas to be
at least workably competitive. 38  Two principal indicia are traditionally
used by economists to measure the degree of monopoly power (market
power) contained within a specific industry: the ratio of concentration
and barriers to entry of new gas producing groups. Breyer and Mac-
Avoy report that FPC statistics show that in the early 1960's the largest
gas producer accounted for less than ten percent, and the fifteen largest
producers, for less than fifty percent of natural gas production.3 In
the separate area markets, statistics indicate that the degree of produc-
tion concentration is "'lower than that in 75-85 percent of industries
in manufactured products.' "40
Another economist, Clark Hawkins, has reported similar find-
ings.41 He found that the largest eight firms in the natural gas produc-
tion industry account for 40% of all sales, while the rest of the market
is relatively unconcentrated.42 He argues that the large unconcentrated
sector could be considered a competitive constraint on the behavior of
the largest eight firms. Regarding barriers to entry, the Hawkins study
concludes that they are substantially less than in most manufacturing
industries, except for possibly the risk factor.43  In addition to these
studies by economists, at least one court44 and the Commission 4 have
concluded independently that the market for natural gas now appears
to be competitive.
Since competitive forces should keep prices down while increasing
supplies of gas, deregulation of the natural gas industry now appears
to be the only realistic policy to elicit more supplies of gas. 40 During
the first year that Order 428 was in effect with small producer prices
38. See authorities cited note 35 supra.
39. Breyer & MacAvoy, supra note 19, at 946.
40. Id., quoting P. MACAVoY, THE CRISiS OF THE REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 156
(1970).
41. C. Hawkins, supra note 6, at 141.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 138. Hawkins argues that the risk factor may not have a significant
effect since high-risk ventures produce high returns and some types of investors are
anxious to support gas producing ventures.
44. Southern La. Area Rate Cases v. FPC, 428 F.2d 407, 416 n.10 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 950 (1970).
45. Belco Petroleum Corp., 49 F.P.C. 1154, 1164 (1973).
46. Recently President Ford advocated the deregulation of natural gas in a message
to Congress, 120 CoNG. REC. 10,120 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1974). Although higher prices
would result for consumers in a time of rampant inflation, more energy supplies are con-
sidered essential.
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tied to the higher market price, significant exploratory activity oc-
curred.17  This evidence dispells arguments by some skeptics of de-
regulation that the supply of natural gas is not responsive to price and
that higher prices for gas would result in windfalls to producers.
Consumer prices under deregulation would necessarily rise to
elicit new supplies. Yet, if the findings by economists and the Com-
mission are correct, these higher prices would not be the result of mo-
nopolistic forces but would represent the incentives necessary to in-
crease exploration and development of gas reserves. The impact on
consumer prices for three different levels of -price increases has been
estimated by Foster Associates, an economic consulting group.48 At
the middle level of sixty-five cents per mcf49 (150% of the present
national ceiling rate) annual consumer expenditures for gas would rise
from approximately $155 in 197250 to $196 by 1980, 5' only a 3.4%
yearly increase.5 2  In comparison with annual consumer expenditures
for other goods, this hardly seems excessive.53
Deregulation of the natural gas industry by Congress would also
seem preferable to further Commission efforts to increase supplies by
formulas based on cost-of-service, average geographical area costs or
any other calculations. The Commission has been unable -to arrive at
any satisfactory regulatory formula over the past twenty years. One
commentator maintains that further attempts would be equally unsatis-
factory. He describes present Commission attempts to arrive at a regu-
lated price as
pseudo-science to a degree it would be difficult to equal. At the
determination [of rate proceedings], the examiner's fumbling
among the numbers and making a cafeteria-style selection from
those presented, plus the commission adding a few delicate adjust-
ments of its own, make the whole thing nothing short of ludicrous.
5 4
47. 1 FPC, NATIONAL GAS SURVEY, cl. 9, at 52 (Preliminary Draft 1970).
48. FOSTER ASSOCIATES, INC., THE IMPACr OF DEREGULATION ON NATURAL GAS
PRiCEs (1973).
49. Mcf (thousand cubic feet) is the traditional volume measurement for natural
gas.
50. FosTER AssocuTEs, INC., supra note 48, at 15.
51. Id. at 22.
52. Id. at viii.
53. Foster reports that average annual consumer expenditures for toilet articles are
$117, for tobacco products $189. It is in relation to these expenditures that consumer
costs for natural gas are compared. Id. at 18.
54. C. Hawkins, supra note 6, at 165. See also SUBCOMM. ON ADMINISTRATrVE
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 2D
SEss., REPORT ON THE REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT .54 (Comm.
Print 1960),. where the Landis Commission concluded that "[tihe Federal Power Corn-
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An example of such fumbling is the FPC's recent response to the
Court's remand of FPC Order 428 in FPC v. Texaco. The Commission
in a proposed rule-making order seeks again indirectly to regulate small
producers similar to the terms of Order 428, but proposes to set the
standard for a "just and reasonable" price at 150% of what large pro-
ducers may sell gas for at the applicable ceiling rate.Yr The Commis-
sion does not define how it arrived at the 150% figure; it simply states
that given small producer higher costs and their valuable contributions
to exploration activities such a higher rate would be justifiable. Of
course, as with other proposed orders, the Commission invites com-
ments on the rate and submits that the figure they present is subject
to change before the final order, if evidence suggests that some other
percentage better meets the test of "just and reasonable." But none-
theless, -this latest proceeding raises the suspicion that present efforts
at regulating the natural gas industry are based more upon Commission
guess-work than expertise.
CONCLUSION
In sum, further Commission attempts to arrive at a magic formula
for regulating the interstate natural gas industry is a dubious exercise.
Given recent conclusions that the -market for natural gas is workably
competitive, further FPC regulation is unnecessary and counterproduc-
tive. The decision in FPC v. Texaco, Inc., given the current wording
of the Natural Gas Act, could not allow the Commission to experiment
with partial deregulation of the producer industry. What is needed is
congressional action. In the face of severe shortages of natural gas,
it is now imperative that Congress react to this decision, the latest eco-
nomic findings and the advice of the President by deregulating the nat-
ural gas producing industry.
CHARLOTTE A. CUNNINGHAM
mission without question represents the outstanding example in the federal government
of the breakdown of the administrative process."
55. 39 Fed. Reg. 33241 (1974).
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